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Models of Pre-Promulgation Review of Legislation 
 
RACHEL J. MYERS* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pre-promulgation review seeks to harmonize legislation with the constitution by engaging 
in a dialogue among government institutions that seeks to prevent unconstitutional legislation from 
becoming law. Pre-promulgation review is an integral part of the lawmaking process, and this 
study seeks to unite scholarship on different methods of this review in a comparative survey to 
assist lawyers, policymakers, and scholars. A wide range of institutions may fulfill the function of 
reviewing proposed legislation for compliance with the constitution or other codes of national 
importance prior to their passage into law. Because of this diversity, scholarship on the topic of 
pre-promulgation review is split between discussions of legislative debate and judicial review by 
courts, rather than as a distinct mechanism. The following analysis presents seven models of pre-
promulgation review currently in practice around the world, further divided into subcategories for 
a total of thirteen approaches. This taxonomy of pre-promulgation constitutional review of 
legislation presents a framework for thinking comparatively about the various mechanisms 
currently in use across the world. Rather than a comprehensive catalogue, the purpose of this 
taxonomy is to provide a concise overview of overarching commonalities of states’ pre-
promulgation review mechanisms to provide categories of the approaches. The framework invites 
further development through additional cases and refinement of its categories as this area of 
institutional design distinguishes itself in the literature. 
 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2021, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Master of Arts Candidate for Russian and 
East European Area Studies, 2021, Indiana University; Bachelor of Arts, 2014, The College of Wooster. 
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II.  FACTORS SHAPING PRE-PROMULGATION REVIEW MECHANISMS 
History,1 regime type,2 religious traditions,3 the power of the judiciary, and the influence 
of international institutions are a few of the contextual factors that shape the type of pre-
promulgation review mechanism a country follows. Other useful characteristics for thinking about 
the categories are the degree of power possessed by the reviewing institution and the function or 
purpose of the review. These factors differ from country to country even within each category of 
the taxonomy. 
 The regularity and formalization of the pre-promulgation review process determines the 
power of the body tasked with the responsibility. Even countries that task the same body and have 
similar procedures for review will establish different degrees of review authority depending on 
which institutions are authorized to initiate the review process. Review bodies with discretion to 
review any or all proposed legislation prior to promulgation will have far greater influence over 
ensuring compliance of legislation with the constitution if the review body may only exercise its 
review power when called upon by another government actor. Benign and strategic justifications 
for not employing a process to review all legislation with the formal pre-promulgation mechanism 
exist. The volume of legislative proposals introduced may make comprehensive review 
impractical. The degree of formalization of the process in the countries cited for each model is 
noted in the discussion below.  
 
 
 
1 In particular, history of colonialism, other institutional legacies, etc. 
2 Such as consolidated democracy, hybrid or illiberal democracy, monarchy, theocracy, etc. 
3 For example, Thailand and Sri Lanka include provisions in their respective constitutions requiring the government 
to protect and uphold the values of Buddhism. Countries with Islamic law may have pre-promulgation review 
mechanisms that address consistency with religious doctrine either as a part of or separate from their constitutions. 
Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA 316, 
325, 329 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014). 
3 
 
III. MODELS OF PRE-PROMULGATION REVIEW 
This section presents seven overarching models currently in use by states based on the 
review body authorized to complete the pre-promulgation review. Building on a combination of 
country and region-specific scholarship4 on pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation, 
the taxonomy presented here seeks to simplify, generalize, and expand the categories to describe 
the university of mechanisms developed around the world. In this taxonomy, the categories are 
organized as follows, and broken down further into related subcategories: (1) Courts, (2) 
Independent Review Committees, (3) Independent Legal Representatives, (4) Legislatures, (5) the 
Executive, (6) Religious Authorities, and (7) Institutional Collaboration. 
 At the outset, it is helpful to clearly define what kind of constitutional review falls within 
the scope of this taxonomy. Pre-promulgation review is a form of abstract constitutional review.5 
Abstract review is an assessment of the “constitutionality of laws without the need to establish a 
concrete case or controversy – that is, in the abstract.”6 Abstract review is about facial 
constitutionality,7 in contrast to other forms of judicial review in which constitutionality is assessed 
in relation to the specific circumstances of a case (concrete review) or an claim of a particular 
rights violation (constitutional complaint review8).9  
 
4 The taxonomy presented here builds, in part, on Maartje De Visser’s detailed exploration of constitutional review 
in Europe. De Visser devotes a chapter to describing non-judicial actors engaged in upholding the constitution and 
discusses in detail the role of constitutional courts engaged in a priori review in the European countries that employ 
these approaches. See generally MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (2014). 
5 Id. at 97 (“Furthermore, a priori review is of necessity abstract, as a law that has not yet entered into force cannot 
have triggered constitutional doubts in the context of an individual case.”). 
6 BENJAMIN BRICKER, VISIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF COURTS AND POLICY IN 
DEMOCRACIES 5, 7 (2016); see also DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 18 (“[I]t’s examination is necessarily ex ante and 
abstract in nature.”). 
7 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 99. 
8 As discussed below, constitutional complaint review can also be a form of pre-promulgation review when raised 
based on concerns that pending legislation will infringe constitutional rights. 
9 BRICKER, supra note 6, at 7. 
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 Each of the models that follow are a form of pre-promulgation, abstract, constitutional 
review of legislation, categorized by the institution reviewing the legislation. As will be illustrated 
in the discussions of each category, many intersecting factors – including those identified in the 
preceding section – and relationships among the institutions involved create levels of complexity 
and variation even within the categories themselves.  
A.  Courts 
 In most countries, courts are considered the primary institutions responsible for interpreting 
and upholding the provisions of the constitution.10 However, pre-promulgation review is not the 
most common posture for assessing constitutionality. Ex ante, a posterior, concrete review of 
constitutional violations resulting from promulgated legislation remains the norm.11 Since World 
War II, the trend towards creating and granting constitutional courts some form of pre-
promulgation review has greatly increased.12  
 1.  Constitutional Courts 
 Constitutional courts are “single, centralized bodies designed to perform constitutional 
judicial review,” and many “allow institutional actors to directly challenge the constitutionality of 
laws.”13 Based on data collected through their research,14 Tom Ginsburg and Scott Elkins noted 
that by 2006 81% of constitutional courts had pre-promulgation review powers.15 A few illustrative 
examples from the European Union (EU) include France, Hungary, Spain, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.16 
 
10 See DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 11. 
11 See id. at 111. 
12 Tom Ginsburg & Zachary Elkins, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2009). 
13 BRICKER, supra note 6, at 5. 
14 The data was collected through what is now known as the Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/. 
15 Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 12, at 1445. 
16 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 100. 
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In most countries that follow this approach, courts do not have the power to review any 
legislative proposals they choose. Another institutional actor, such as the legislature or executive, 
holds the authority to seek the review of the court. In most countries, the referring institutions are 
other governmental actors, but in Belgium private actors are also authorized to refer abstract 
questions of constitutionality to the constitutional court.17 
2.  Constitutional Councils 
 Constitutional councils are based on the French model, established in 1958.18 At its 
inception, “[t]he Conseil [C]onstitionnel’s principal function consisted of hearing challenges 
against laws before their promulgation in order to make sure that they did not fall foul of the 
distribution of powers between the government and Parliament laid down in the 1958 
constitution.”19 The French constitutional council has been “considered the archetype of a court 
competent to hear a priori constitutionality challenges.”20 Until 2008, the Conseil Constitutionnel 
had only pre-promulgation review authority and enacted statutes were immune from challenges.21  
The Conseil Constitutionnel strengthened its power by issuing a decision in 1971 claiming 
the authority to review laws for compliance substantive constitutional provisions and fundamental 
rights, and in 1974 a constitutional amendment gave minority legislators the authority to request 
review of legislation – whereas that power had previously been reserved only to the leaders of 
parliament and the executive and those in the political majority.22 The historical development is 
 
17 Id. at 99. 
18 Id. at 59. 
19 Id. at 60. 
20 Id. at 101. 
21 Id. at 100. 
22 Id.  
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important, because these features are now considered hallmarks of the constitutional council model 
of constitutional review, and the institution has been adopted in many other countries.23  
The model is prevalent in former French colonies, where it was widely adopted.24 For 
example, the constitutional courts25 in Thailand and Cameroon are based on this model.26 In each 
case, the model has variations. In Cameroon, the constitutional council is limited to only reviewing 
legislation at the pre-promulgation stage, rather than holding that power in combination with post-
promulgation and concrete review.27 
In addition to the historical emphasis of the model on pre-promulgation review, two main 
differences distinguish constitutional councils from constitutional courts. For one, members of 
constitutional councils, under the French model, are not required to have legal training.28 
Additionally, constitutional councils were designed with an emphasis on their advisory role, in 
contrast to the power often vested in courts to issue binding decisions on other government actors. 
It should be noted that in practice neither of these characteristics are strictly delineated between 
these two institutions. Constitutional courts sometimes include members from nonlegal 
backgrounds, and some constitutional councils exercise binding authority.29 
 
 
 
23 Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in East Asia, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA, 47, 61 
(Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter Constitutional Courts in East Asia].  
24 Id. at 69. 
25 In other countries, the constitutional council model is sometimes labeled a constitutional court, but such examples 
still fall in this category based on possessing the specific characteristics of the constitutional council model that 
originated in France. 
26 Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation, 3 J. COMP. L. 80, 88 (2008) 
[hereinafter Understanding Variation]; Charles Manga Fombad, Protecting Constitutional Values in Africa: A 
Comparison of Botswana and Cameroon, 36 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 83, 101 (2003). 
27 Fombad, supra note 26, at 99–100. 
28 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 59; see Understanding Variation, supra note 26, at 92. 
29 See, e.g., DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 213 (Italy’s constitutional court includes a number of law professors). 
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3.  Committees Within Courts 
This category of pre-promulgation review is effectively a constitutional council situated 
within the institution of the supreme court. A defining feature of constitutional courts is that they 
review only questions of constitutional law.30 In contrast, supreme courts hear issues relating to 
the legal system as a whole, which may or may not include constitutional issues.31 An option that 
falls between authorizing the supreme court to assess constitutional issues and establishing a 
separate constitutional court is to create a constitutional committee within the supreme court with 
special expertise and jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality.32 
Estonia’s constitution establishes a constitutional review chamber within the supreme 
court.33 In the scope of its pre-promulgation review powers, the president of Estonia may request 
from the chamber an assessment of legislation proposed by the parliament.34 In the Estonian 
system, this authority applies in cases in which the parliament resubmits an act that the president 
has already returned once without signing into law – a power used sparingly.35 Algeria’s 
constitution also details the pre-promulgation review process as a consultation with the 
constitutional council by the legislature and executive.36 In each of these cases, the court’s review 
committee is not independently authorized to review legislation for constitutionality; it must be 
prompted to do so by another government actor. This process means only select laws are subjected 
to pre-promulgation review for constitutionality, and the legislature, executive, and other political 
bodies are free to bypass this step. 
 
 
30 Id. at 95. 
31 See id. at 95–96. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 96. 
34Id. at 36. 
35 Id. 
36 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, Art. 141 (1989). 
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B.  Independent Review Committees 
 The category of independent review committees is illustrated by two institutions that 
generally carry out the same function as the court-based bodies above, but that exist as independent 
and unaffiliated from any branch of the government, and generally do not carry out other duties 
aside from the primary role of pre-promulgation review of legislation.37  
1.  Council of State 
An institution known as a council of state is the main example of pre-promulgation 
constitutional review of legislation. In Europe this institution has a long history.38 Councils of state 
are independent of the other branches and institutions of government and act as advisors to 
government institutions such as the legislature and the executive.39 As De Visser defines their role, 
“They can, and sometimes must, provide advisory opinions on legislative bills and proposals for 
other legal norms.”40 This model exists in the EU countries of Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Spain.41 In some countries councils of state are the only body 
tasked with pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation, as in Belgium and Greece.42 It 
is also common for the council to fill its role in conjunction with a separate mandate held by the 
judiciary or legislature, as in the Netherlands, France (sharing the role with the constitutional 
council discussed above), Italy, Luxemburg, and Spain.43 The Dutch Council of State is consulted 
prior to the passage of every piece of parliamentary legislation and is empowered to issue opinions 
sua sponte, which the government then must take into account.44 In other systems, the government 
 
37 Further examples of institutions that fit the general description may exist under different names in other countries. 
38 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 14.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 14–15. 
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must engage the council over its input on legislative constitutionality, but is not required to follow 
it, as in Belgium.45 
2.  Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Constitution 
 Constitutional review in Afghanistan is controversially split between the Supreme Court 
the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Constitution.46 In practice the power is 
shared between these bodies and each has attempted to carve out a particular type of constitutional 
jurisdiction, though the line between their respective purviews is not always followed.47 Since 
2010, the commission has established itself in the role of pre-promulgation review of legislative 
bills in an advisory capacity for both the legislature and the executive and at their request.48 
C.  Independent Legal Representatives 
 What distinguishes independence legal representatives from court committees and other 
designated committees for legislative review is that this is a position for a single individual who is 
not a member of any court, and is meant to be independent from the legislature, executive, and 
other institutions of the government. 
 1. Chancellors of Justice 
 The position of chancellor of justice is an independent position appointed by the president 
or parliament. According to De Visser’s study of constitutional review in Europe, this position 
exists in Finland, Estonia, and Sweden.49 In Finland, the constitution calls on the chancellor to 
ensure the constitutionality and lawfulness of government acts and legislation.50 The chancellor 
 
45 Id. at 17. 
46 Shamshad Pasarlay, Restraining Judicial Power: The Fragmented System of Judicial Review and Constitutional 
Interpretation in Afghanistan, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 245, 248 (2018).  
47 Id. at 249.  
48 Id. at 275–77. 
49 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 20 
50 Id.; CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND 1999 (rev. 2011), Section 112. 
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works in close conjunction with the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee, a parliamentary 
committee discussed below. In Estonia the chancellor reviews proposed legislative for 
constitutional conformity when called upon by a parliamentary committee; therefore, there is not 
a mandate for the chancellor’s review of every piece of legislation.51 However, another avenue for 
the chancellor’s influence is in comments on legal drafts included on the parliament’s daily agenda. 
In practice, it is not feasible or necessary for the chancellor to comment on every piece of 
legislation, but the chancellor has discretion to prioritize which pieces of legislation she addresses, 
and in the majority of cases the government accounts for her comments in revisions prior to 
passage.52 
2.  Defender or Commissioner of Constitutional Rights  
Another model involving a special judicial expert to asses constitutionality of draft 
legislation is through an appointed defender or commissioner of constitutional rights “with the task 
of ensuring that public authorities duly respect individuals’ rights and the freedoms as enshrined 
in the constitution.”53 Countries that use this approach in Europe include Finland, France, Hungary, 
Poland, and Spain.54 This mechanism can be used either during the pre-promulgation phase as well 
as to challenge legislation after it has been passed. The defender of constitutional rights role exists 
in many places outside Europe, though it is more frequently used to challenge post-promulgation 
applications of statutes and laws that are asserted to be violations of individual rights as applied.55 
 
 
 
51 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 21. 
52 Id. at 22. 
53 Id. at 45–46. 
54  Id. at 46. 
55 See, e.g., BRICKER, supra note 6, at 7. 
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D.  Legislatures 
In keeping with allocating primary law-making authority to the legislature, one model is to 
assign responsibility for ensuring constitutionality of proposed legislation to the legislature as a 
whole, or to both houses in the case of bicameral legislatures. Bahrain is one example of a country 
whose constitution follows this model.56 
1.  Upper House 
 In bicameral legislatures, the upper house of parliament often plays a greater role in 
constitutional assessment of legislation, whereas the lower house focuses on political and 
legislative policy issues.57 The justification for this is the idea that the upper house is somewhat 
more removed from daily political pressures, and therefore in a better position to assess neutrally 
and appeal to constitutional rather than political principles.58 In the Netherlands, the Senate fills 
the constitutional assessment role, consistent with this model.59 The Senate bears the responsibility 
for upholding the constitution in passing legislation, rather than outsourcing the role to separate 
institution to provide an outside check. 
2.  Parliamentary Committees 
 Preparatory work in the development of legislation commonly takes place in designated 
committees composed of members of parliament, which some are specifically tasked with 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislative proposals.  
Finland’s Constitution states, “The Constitutional Law Committee shall issue statements 
on the constitutionality of legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 25. 
58 See id.  
59 Id.; see also Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 
Art. 85. 
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well as on their relation to international human rights treaties.”60 The Constitutional Law 
Committee is comprised of at least seventeen members elected in parliament by secret ballot, and 
its role is conducted in connection with the role of Finland’s chancellor of justice (discussed 
above), who refers legislative proposals she deems constitutionally questionable to the committee 
before the legislature moves forward with its passage.61  The committee’s process of review begins 
with a hearing which includes consultations with civil servants and experts, such as professors of 
constitutional law, followed by an internal meeting where the committee decides its position on 
the constitutional question and advises the parliament on how to proceed or revise the legislation.62 
The committee’s decisions are not officially binding, but are customarily followed in the Finnish 
system.63 
 The United Kingdom’s twelve-member House of Lords Constitution Committee was 
established in 2001 with a mandate to “examine all public bills introduced to the House of Lords 
for matters of constitutional significance.”64 The committee requests information and prepares 
reports on bills that raise “questions of principle about principal parts of the Constitution.”65 The 
House of Lords is expected to consider the report and respond to it within two months.66 
E.  The Executive 
 A common constitutional provision relating to the executive branch is an assertion of 
responsibility on the head of state to uphold the constitution. This mandate applies both to the 
heads’ of states own behavior and policy enactments and in their role as a check on the legislature 
 
60 Constitution of Finland 1999 (rev. 2011), Section 74. 
61 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 21, 28. 
62 Id. at 27. 
63 Id. at 28. 
64 Id. at 30. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 30–31. 
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through the signing of proposed legislation into law.67 Heads of state may be authorized to assess 
constitutionality independently and additionally to consult other bodies of review for 
constitutionality questions. The emphasis in this category as a mechanism of pre-promulgation 
constitutional review of legislation is that the executive power is exercised based on the 
justification of an assessment of constitutionality, not some other executive interest. 
 1.  Democratic Heads of State: Veto with Constitutional Justifications 
The power to sign legislation vests substantial power in the head of state to determine the 
validity of legislation, and the executive’s approval or refusal to sign may be based on assessments 
of constitutionality. As a mechanism, the power of heads of state in parliamentary and presidential 
democracies share basic similarities. In some systems the power described here is exercised by a 
prime minister and in others by a president. In Estonia, as in many other cases, the president may 
send back draft legislation for revision if he or she deems it unconstitutional.68 German federal 
presidents also have the explicit power to refuse to promulgate legislation they deem to be 
unconstitutional.69  
 2.  Constitutional Monarchs 
Constitutional monarchies are varied in the degree of power monarchs have in the final say 
over whether proposed legislation is constitutional. On one end of the spectrum is Luxemburg, 
whose constitution was revised in 2009 to remove the requirement of monarchic approval of 
legislation entirely, rendering executive signature of laws submitted by the legislature a procedural 
formality.70 However, on the other extreme another common model of pre-promulgation review 
 
67 Id. at 36.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 40.  
70 Id.; Luxembourg's Constitution of 1868, Art. 34. 
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empowers the monarch with a high degree of autonomy to determine the constitutionality of 
legislation without consultation to another review body or deference to the legislature.  
Between these extremes is the model followed by Bahrain, which is similar to the role of 
the head of state in parliamentary and presidential democracies discussed above, in which the king 
is granted the authority to request review from the constitutional court on the validity of proposed 
legislation. Bahrain’s constitution indicates, “The King may refer to the Court any draft laws 
before they are adopted to determine the extent of their agreement with the Constitution. The 
Court’s determination is binding on all State authorities and on everyone.”71 The process is a 
middle ground in terms of the level of power vested in the monarch, because while the king 
controls which legislation is submitted to the court for review, once the court has opined the king 
cannot overrule it. 
Other countries that employ models falling into one of the other identified categories may 
involve royal actors. For example, the Dutch monarch is the formal head of the Constitutional 
Council, but, in practice, the vice-president leads the institution.72 
F.  Religious Authorities 
 Many constitutions recognize religious authority as protected or authoritative. Ran Hirschl 
presents three categories of constitutional and religious authority interplay: (1) “constitutional 
‘secularism’ alongside religious pluralism (e.g. India);” (2) “preferential constitutional treatment 
of a particular religion of group of religions but without exclusive establishment of a single faith 
as a ‘state religion’ or a mandatory source of legislation (e.g. Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka[,] 
and other predominantly Buddhist countries);” and (3) “varieties of ‘Islamic 
 
71 Constitution of Bahrain, Art. 106 (2002). 
72 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 15. 
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constitutionalism’…(i.e. full endorsement of Islam as the single state religion and its establishment 
as ‘a’ or ‘the’ source of legislation).”73 The status of religion within the constitution influences 
how the government will assess religion in pre-promulgation review of legislation.  
On example is in the Islamic Republic of Iran where an independent religious authority 
called the Guardian Council has the constitutional authority to review and determine the 
compliance of proposed legislation with Islamic principles.74 The Iranian constitution describes 
this procedure: 
All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly [the legislature] must 
be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a 
maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with 
the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it 
will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed 
enforceable.75 
 
G.  Institutional Collaboration 
The concept behind this category is that multiple actors are simultaneously tasked with 
specifically considering the constitutional implication of legislation throughout a collaborative 
drafting process. This approach is in contrast to the process outlined in the above models in which 
legislative debate and assessment of constitutionality is siloed among various actors at particular 
stages of legislative drafting, revision, and approval. Instead of establishing a referral mechanism 
to particular actors to review legislative proposals, multiple government institutions are involved 
consistently throughout the drafting and revision process – and each of these institutions must 
specifically consider constitutionality in its assessment. 
 
73 Hirschl, supra note 3, at 317. 
74 Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] Art. 4, 72, 94, 112 
[1980]. 
75 Id. Art. 94. 
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The description of this category is drawn from a major legislative reform effort in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic.76 A recent report conducted by the Ministry of Justice of Lao and 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provides a useful description of their approach 
to pre-promulgation review: 
The notion of a “separation of powers”, with distinct roles and actors in legislative, 
executive and judicial branches, is not deeply rooted in the current reality of the 
Lao law-making process. Instead, a collaborative system, with actors from the 
Ministry of Justice on the executive side, engaged in law drafting efforts with 
individual members of the National Assembly, results in draft laws taking their 
shape in the most part before they are finally submitted to the plenary session. Even 
after the plenary session of the National Assembly holds its debates and suggests 
revisions, the draft law may return to the original drafters who come from a mix of 
different line ministries, as well as from the other agencies with the right of 
legislative initiative.77 
 
 How this process is developed in Lao and whether other countries adopt this kind of 
approach will clarify the definition of this category. At this stage, the purpose and method suggest 
a distinct approach to pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation. 
III. RELEVANCE OF TAXONOMY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This taxonomy of pre-promulgation review models intends to assist scholars and 
policymakers in understanding the range of design options for ensuring legislative 
constitutionality. It provides a framework of models from which to extend analysis to the 
application and implication of using particular models to better understand their operation in 
practice. From this starting point, several areas for further research are proposed below. 
 
 
 
76 See generally, UNDP, The Law-Making Process in Lao PDR: A Baseline Study, Ministry of Justice and UNDP 
LAO PDR (2015), http://www.la.undp.org/content/dam/laopdr/docs/Reports and publications/2015/2015-12-15 
Baseline report-final version.pdf (last visited Sep. 9, 2018). 
77 Id. at 14. 
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A.  Roles of Pre-Promulgation Review 
The official role of pre-promulgation review is to review legislation to ensure proposed 
laws are consistent with the constitution prior to their passage; however, the practice may serve a 
number of governmental goals, towards both legitimate and informal ends. The function served by 
pre-promulgation review may be shaped by the type of model employed. Future analyses could 
further explore the association of particular pre-promulgation review models with different goals. 
The goals suggested by this initial research include: (1) approving legislation, (2) recommending 
revision to proposed legislation, (3) rejecting proposed legislation as incompatible with the 
constitution, (4) rejecting proposed legislation for political or public policy reasons, (5) stalling or 
preventing passage of legislation by governmental actors opposed to the law. 
B.  Multiple Institutions and Overlapping Mandates 
Review by multiple committees can be of the same piece of legislation at different points 
in its review and approval process, or legislation may be siloed by topic and sent to a particular 
committee based on subject matter. A number of countries discussed above involved several 
institutions overlapping to some degree in their pre-promulgation review role. In such cases, 
institutions may be tasked with review of particular types of legislation or at different points in the 
timeline of the legislative process. In addition to those cited above, a few cases are notable for the 
complexity and number of actors involved in the pre-promulgation review process to assess 
constitutionality. A central question that arises from this dynamic is the effect of combining 
different approaches. Closer comparative case studies of countries in this taxonomy may yield 
helpful information about how different actors and mechanisms may or may not work well 
together.  
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C.  Evaluating Power Dynamics of the Mechanism in Context 
Many of the sources that informed this taxonomy include the scholar’s perspectives about 
whether and which of these systems of pre-promulgation constitutional review are effective and in 
what contexts. This study refrains from commenting on these issues, but the taxonomy could be 
the basis for a study that inquired into how each mechanism operates in practice across countries. 
Such a framework may aid further study into questions of what works well in particular types of 
systems and what options are available to scholars and policy makers seeking to reform or 
introduce new approaches. 
D.  Expanding and Refining the Categories 
 The best way to test the categories presented in this taxonomy is to expand the analysis to 
additional countries and to seek to fit those new data points into the framework. Constitutions are 
a useful place to begin this inquiry. However, while the mechanism for constitutional review may 
be referenced in a country’s constitution, such provisions often do not specify when or how review 
should occur. Furthermore, scholarship from country-specific experts often indicates that the 
process is far different in practice from what the constitution proscribes. A case that does not fit 
the proposed taxonomy may yield an addition or restructuring of the categories. Further research 
in this vein will contribute to an improved understanding of pre-promulgation constitutional 
review of legislation. The country index below contains a list of all the country cases included in 
this initial study. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The categories proposed herein are a possible framework to think broadly and 
comparatively about the design options for pre-promulgation review mechanisms. The overview 
presented her illustrates the need for further study of pre-promulgation review mechanisms as this 
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step in the legislative process receives growing recognition as a meaningful governmental design 
question. Few comprehensive analyses of the role of legislatures and other actors in the legislative 
drafting process in upholding constitutionality have been conducted.78 The mechanism selected 
appears to have the potential to change power dynamics in government; therefore, policy makers 
may seek to alter the approach in their countries either through procedural changes or formal 
constitutional amendments, could elevate the influence of the constitution in controlling legislation 
and have major implications for government policy. 
V. COUNTRY INDEX79 
 
Country 
 
Model 
 
Subcategory Title of Review Body  
(original language where 
available) 
Afghanistan Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Independent Commission 
for the Supervision of the 
Constitution 
Independent Commission for 
the Supervision of the 
Constitution 
Algeria Courts Committees within 
Courts 
Constitutional Council80 
Bahrain The Executive Constitutional Monarch King submits to 
Constitutional Court81 
 Legislatures Parliamentary 
Committees 
Chamber of Deputies, 
National Assembly82 
Belgium Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State83 
Cameroon Courts Constitutional Council Constitutional Council84 
Estonia Courts Committees within 
Courts 
Constitutional Review 
Chamber85 
 Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Chancellors of Justice Chancellor of Justice 
(Õiguskantsler)86 
 
78 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 23. 
79 Data collected from Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/. 
80 Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Art. 141 (1989). 
81 Constitution of Bahrain, Art. 106 (2002). 
82 Id.  
83 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13. 
84  Constitution of Cameroon, Art. 471 (2008). 
85 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 36. 
86 Id. at 21.  
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 The Executive  Democratic Head of 
State: Veto with 
Constitutional 
Justification 
President87 
Finland Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Chancellors of Justice Chancellor of Justice 
(Oikeuskansleri)88 
 Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Defender or 
Commissioner of 
Constitutional Rights 
- 
 Legislatures Parliamentary 
Committees 
Constitutional Law 
Committee 
(Perustuslakivaliokunta)89 
France Courts Constitutional Council Constitutional Council 
(Conseil constitutionnel)90 
 Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Defender or 
Commissioner of 
Constitutional rights 
- 
 Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State91 
Germany The Executive  Democratic Head of 
State: Veto with 
Constitutional 
Justification 
Federal President92 
Greece Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State93 
Hungary Courts Constitutional Courts Constitutional Court94 
 Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Defender or 
commissioner of 
constitutional rights 
 
Iran Religious 
Authorities 
- Islamic Consultative 
Assembly submits to the 
Guardian Council95 
Italy Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State96 
 
87 Id. at 36. 
88 Id. at 20. 
89 Id. at 26. 
90 Id. at 7. 
91 Id. at 13. 
92 Id. at 40. 
93 Id. at 13. 
94 Id. at 6. 
95 Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] Art. 94 [1980]. 
96 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13. 
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Lao PDR Institutional 
Collaboration 
- Ministry of Justice, National 
Assembly, original drafters, 
other ministries97 
Luxemburg The Executive Constitutional Monarch Procedural signature only98 
 Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State99 
The 
Netherlands 
Legislatures Upper House Senate (Eerste Kamer)100 
 Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State The Dutch Council of 
State101 
Poland Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Defender or 
Commissioner of 
Constitutional rights 
- 
Spain Independent Legal 
Representatives 
Defender or 
Commissioner of 
Constitutional rights 
- 
 Independent 
Review 
Committees 
Councils of State Council of State102 
Thailand Courts Constitutional Council Constitutional Council103 
United 
Kingdom 
Legislatures Parliamentary 
Committees 
House of Lords Constitution 
Committee104 
    
 
 
 
97 UNDP, supra note 76, at 14. 
98 Id. at 40. 
99 Id. at 13. 
100 Id. at 25. 
101 Id. at 14–15. 
102 Id. at 13. 
103 Constitutional Courts in East Asia, supra note 23, at 61. 
104 DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 30. 
